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THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL YARON: CONTINUING IMPUNITY 
FOR THE SABRA AND SHATILLA MASSACRES 
Linda A. Malone* 
In December of 1999, General Amos Y aron was appointed to serve 
as head of Israel's Defense Ministry. Earlier, in August of 1986, Yaron 
had been appointed military attache to the United States. In reaction to the 
1986 appointment, survivors of a 1982 massacre of Palestinians living in 
Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps located in Lebanon filed a complaint in 
the District of Columbia District Court. The complaint alleged Y aron 
violated U.S. treaties, customary international law, and U.S. statutes 
incorporating international customary international law. The complaint 
provided that: 
The defendant Y aron is not entitled to any immunity from accountability 
before this Court by virtue of a claim of diplomatic immunity. Article 146 of 
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 is an express waiver of diplomatic 
immunity with respect to those alleged to have committed grave breaches as 
defined by Article 147. Moreover, under the Nuremberg Principles and the 
principle of customary international law known as jus co gens which has 
been incorporated into the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, two 
governments cannot agree to immunize a war criminal from accountability 
for his acts. 
The defendant Y aron is not entitled to any immunity from accountability 
arising out of any otherwise arguably applicable statute of limitations, in that 
customary international law provides that there shall be no statute of 
limitations with respect to war crimes because of the particularly grievous 
nature of such violations.1 
Nevertheless, the case was dismissed on immunity grounds. 
That Y aron evaded responsibility and sanctions for his conduct at the 
time of his rise through the Israeli Defense Ministry to his recent 
achievement of its highest post violates international law, and dishonors 
the memory of the hundreds of civilians who were brutally massacred 
over a two-day period in an area of Lebanon under his direct control. This 
commentary explores the past and present prohibition of such impunity 
under international law, based on the findings with respect to Yaron's 
responsibility as determined by the Israeli commission, which 
investigated the massacres. 
On September 28, 1982, the Israeli Cabinet resolved to establish a 
commission of inquiry2 pursuant to Israel's Commission of Inquiry Law 
1 The Palestine Yearbook of International Law, Vol. V, 1989 at 254 (on file with 
author). 
2 See Kahan Report at 3, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 373, 373; see also Christopher Walker, 
Begin Agrees to Hold Massacre Inquiry, TIMES (London), Sept. 29, 1982 at 1. 
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of 1968,3 largely in response to the largest protest demonstration in 
Israel's history.4 The commission's charge was to examine "all the facts 
and factors connected with the atrocity carried out by a unit of the 
Lebanese Forces against the civilian population in the Shatilla and Sabra 
camps. "5 Yitzhak Kahan, President of the Israeli Supreme Court, was 
selected chairman of the commission . 6 
The issuance of the commission's Report, rekindled the controversy 
on a new level - focusing on the individual responsibility of many high 
ranking Israeli officials, including former Prime Minister Be9in, then 
Minister of Defense Sharon, and then Foreign Minister Shamir. A brief 
flurry of reprimands, to the extent they can be denominated as such, 
followed - Sharon, one of the most harshly criticized individuals in the 
Report, merely lost his portfolio. 8 No other individual prosecutions or 
sanctions were imposed. 
I. PRELUDE TO THE MASSACRE 
What became known in Israel as the "Peace for the Galilee" war 
began on June 6, 1982.9 From June 12 to 14, Israeli Defense Force 
(I.D.F.) took over the suburbs of Beirut and joined with the Christian 
forces controlling East Beirut. 10 On June 15, the Israeli Cabinet resolved 
that any entry into West Beirut would be by the Phalangists with the help 
of the I.D.F., and by June 25, the I.D.F. had encircled West Beirut. 11 On 
3 The outline of the facts as found by the Kahan Report, which demonstrate Yaron's 
responsibility, are provided in more detail in Linda A. Malone, The Kahan Report, Ariel 
Sharon, and the Sabra-Shatilla Massacres: Responsibility under International Law for 
Massacres of Civilian Populations, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 373. 
4 See Crisis in Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1982, at 6. Other influential factors 
leading to the inquiry were the resignation of Energy Minister Yitzhak Berman, outraged at 
the Cabinet's failure to establish a commission of inquiry, and President Yitzhak Navon's 
call for an inquiry. See Robert Fisk, Tentative Hopes for an Open Beirut, TIMES (London), 
Sept. 23, 1982, at 5. 
5 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 3. The "camps" actually consist of many one or two 
room cement structures with several larger, mainly two-story buildings, all separated by 
alleyways. MICHAEL JANSEN, THE BATTLE OF BEIRUT: WHY ISRAEL INVADED LEBANON 97 
(1982). 
6 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 3. 
7 See JERUSALEM PosT, Feb. 13-19, 1983, at 1, col. 1-2 (int'l ed., on file with author). 
8 See id. at col. 3-5. 
9 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 7. 
10 See id. 
11 See id. In the report, the Commission briefly addressed whether mere inclusion of 
Phalangists in West Beirut's entry could be the basis for indirect Israeli responsibility for the 
massacres. First, the Commission concluded that the June 15 resolution could not be deemed 
the basis for the Phalangists' later involvement in the entry, as urged by Begin and Sharon. It 
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August 19, an agreement between Lebanon, the United States, France, 
Italy, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) was 
reached with the negotiating assistance of the United States through 
Ambassador Philip C. Habib.12 It provided for the evacuation of P.L.O. 
and Syrian forces from West Beirut. By August 23, Bashir Gemayel was 
elected president of Lebanon, his term of office to begin one month 
later. 13 
From August 21 to 26, the multinational American, French and 
Italian force arrived in Beirut, and oversaw the evacuation ofP.L.O. and 
Syrian forces until it was completed on September 1.14 The Report then 
notes in its chronology that 
... [a]ccording to information from various sources, the terrorists did not 
fulfill their obligation to evacuate all their forces from West Beirut and hand 
their weapons over to the Lebanese army but left in West Beirut, according 
to various estimates, approximately 2,000 fighters, as well as many arms 
caches, some of which were handed over by the terrorists to the Lebanese 
leftist militia "Mourabitoun". 15 
The multinational force left Lebanon from September 10 to 12, after 
the completion of the evacuation, but less than one week before the 
massacres occurred.16 
The Report states that when word of Bashir Jemayel' s assassination 
reached Israel at approximately 11:00 p.m. on Tuesday, September 14, 
Prime Minister Begin, Minister of Defense Sharon, and Chief of Staff 
Eitan decided that the I.D.F. would enter West Beirut, without seeking a 
Cabinet resolution to that effect.17 Although Sharon and Eitan purportedly 
found that the June circumstances had changed entirely by September, after the evacuation of 
Syrian and P.L.O. forces and after Bashire Jemayel's assassination. Nevertheless, despite the 
lack of a formal Cabinet resolution, the Commission concluded there was no responsibility 
for the Phalangists in the entry into West Beirut. The political and military reasons for 
including the Phalangists justified their involvement in West Beirut, according to the Report, 
negating any potential responsibility on that basis alone. See id. at 13. The decision to enter 
West Beirut was also made by Begin and Sharon, without Cabinet approval. See Kahan 
Report, supra note 2. 
12 See id.; see also BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY 
NO. 415, LEBANON: PLAN FOR THE PLO EVACUATION FROM WEST BEIRUT (Aug. 1982). 
13 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 7. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. at 8. There was no prior consultation with the Cabinet; Foreign Minister Sharnir 
was the only minister informed of this decision, which he endorsed. The Commission 
concluded that no indirect responsibility for the massacres could be predicated on this 
decision, because of the "extraordinary emergency situation" created by Bashir Jemayel' s 
290 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol.32:287 
discussed including Phalangists in the operation, the Commission 
determined it was not mentioned to Prime Minister Begin. 18 Chief of Staff 
Eitan testified that at 8:30p.m. on September 14, he and Defense Minister 
Sharon agreed that Phalangists would enter the Sabra and Shatilla 
camps. 19 
The operating order for the entry into West Beirut that played a 
pivotal part in the ensuing massacres was Order Number 6 to the I.D.F., 
which provided in part that "the refugee camps are not to be entered. 
Searching and mopping u~ the camps will be done by the 
Phalangists/Lebanese army. "2 
II. THE MASSACRE UNFOLDS 
At this point, the events that ultimately culminated in the massacres 
at the Sabra and Shatilla camps were set in motion. Sometime in the 
evening between September 14 and September 15, Chief of Staff Eitan 
met in Beirut with Major General Drori and the division commander?1 At 
3:30a.m. on September 15, Chief of StaffEitan went to the Phalangists' 
headquarters and, according to his own testimony, "ordered the Phalangist 
commanders to effect a general mobilization of all their forces, impose a 
general curfew on all areas under their control, and be ready to take part 
in the fighting."22 The Phalangist commanders asked for twenty-four 
hours to prepare?3 Chief of Staff Eitan then asked that a Phalan¥,ist 
liaison officer come to the Israeli division's forward command post. 4 
On September 15, 1982, the entry into West Beirut began.25 The 
I.D.F. entered West Beirut shortly before 6:00 a.m.26 That same day 
between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., Defense Minister Sharon met at the 
forward command post with Chief of Staff Eitan who reported his 
agreement with the Phalangists for their entry into the camps?7 Sharon 
approved the agreement and phoned Prime Minister Begin from the roof 
assassination. See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 13. The Lebanese army, it states, could not 
have enforced order in West Beirut. See id. 
18 See id. 
19 See id at 9. 
20 See id. at 8. 
21 See id. at 9 
22 See id. 
23 SeeKahan Report, supra note 2, at 9. 
24 See id. 
25 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 9. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
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of the command post.Z8 Yet, according to the Report, Sharon only 
informed Begin that there was no resistance in Beirut and that the 
operations were going well.29 Also present at the forward command post 
were the Defense Minister's aide Duda'i, the Director of Military 
Intelligence Yehoshua Saguy, a representative of the Mossad, Major 
General Drori,30 and Brigadier General Yaron, among others. Duda'i's 
notes of the meeting stated that the Phalangists were to be sent into the 
camps, and that Sharon had s~oken twice with the Prime Minister from 
the roof of the command post. 1 On September 16, the Defense Minister's 
office issued a document signed by Duda'i summarizing in two crucial, 
controversial sentences Sharon's instructions in this meeting regarding the 
entry into West Beirut: "Only one element, and that is the I.D.F., shall 
command the forces in the area. For the operation in the camps the 
Phalangists should be sent in.'m The document was directed to Chief of 
Staff Eitan, the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Director of Military 
Intelligence.33 It is known, from a stamp on that office's copy, that the 
Director of Military Intelligence's office received the document.34 
Witnesses disagreed about whether this instruction signified that 
Phalangists' forces were to be directly under I.D.F. command.35 
Thursday, September 16, 1982, was the day on which the three-day 
massacres began. In the early morning hours, Chief of Staff Eitan 
returned to Te1Aviv.36 At 10:00 a.m., Sharon met in his office with Chief 
of Staff Eitan, the Director of Mili~ Intelligence, Brigadier General 
Saguy, and Mr. Duda'i, among others.3 Eitan announced, "the whole city 
is in our hands, complete quiet prevails now, the camps are surrounded, 
the Phalangists are to go at 11:00-12:00. Yesterday we spoke to them ... 
The situation now is that the entire city is in our hands, the camps are all 
closed.''38Specifically referring to a map, Eitan stated that I.D.F. forces 
surrounded the Sabra and Shatilla camps, and that it was agreed the 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 Major General Drori was commander oflsrael's Northern Region in addition to being 
in charge of the Golan Heights and the Lebanese territories occupied at the beginning of the 
war. See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 5. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. at 10-11. 
33 See id. at 11. 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 10. 
37 See id. 
38 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Phalangists would go in at their discretion, after a coordinating session 
with the Israeli officials. 39 
The first session coordinating the Phalangists' entry into the camps 
was held at 11:00 a.m. on September 16.40 Unnamed Phalangist 
commanders met with Major General Drori at the headquarters of one of 
the divisions.41 It was again agreed that the Phalangists would enter the 
camps, coordinating their entry with Brigadier General Y aron that very 
afternoon at the forward command post. 42 It was also agreed that a 
company of 150 fighters from the Phalangist force would enter the camps 
from south to north and from west to east.43 Brigadier General Yaron, 
discussed purported terrorist locations in the camp and, apparently still 
apprehensive about the Phalangists' involvement, also warned the 
Phalangists commanders not to harm the civilian population.44 
The Report then notes that Y aron required safety checks upon the 
Phalangists. The Report first remarks that Y aron set up lookout posts on 
the roof of the forward command post and on a nearby roof "even though 
he knew that it was impossible to see very much of what was going on in 
the camps from these lookouts. "45 An additional measure, not specified in 
the Report and described only in the classified Appendix B to the Report, 
was imgosed to ascertain the actions of the Phalangists' forces in the 
camps. 6 Yaron and the Phalangists also stipulated that a Phalangist 
liaison officer with a "communications set" would be present at all times 
on the roof of the forward command post with a Moss ad liaison officer at 
the Phalangists' headquarters. 47 
At approximately 6:00 p.m. on Thursday, September 16, the 
Phalangists entered the camps, initially entering the Shatilla camp from 
the west and southwest, as directed.48 Around 7:00p.m., Israeli Lieutenant 
39 See id. 
40 See id. at II. 
41 See id. 
42 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at II. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. 
47 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at II. 
48 See id. Other sources have since placed the exact time at 5:15p.m. The Report at this 
point in its analysis, in a marked departure from its generally unemotional tone, states that 
there were "armed terrorist forces" in the camps, whose extent they could not establish but 
whose arrns were being used against the I.D.F. As noted in the Report, these hidden arms and 
terrorists never materialized. See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 6-7. The Commission 
concludes that this terrorist force had not been evacuated for two reasons: renewal of the 
underground terrorist activity at a later period, and to protect the civilian population, which 
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Elul overheard a transmission over the Phalangists' communication set to 
Elie Hobeika while he was on the roof of the command post. 49 He hear~ a 
Phalangist officer from the forces in the camp tell Hobeika there were 50 
women and children and ask what he should do.50 Hobeika replied, "[t]his 
is the last time you're going to ask me a question like that, you know 
exactly what to do." This remark was followed by "raucous laughter" by 
the Phalangists on the roof.51 Brigadier General Yaron, who was also on 
the roof, asked Lieutenant Elul what he had overheard. 52 When Lieutenant 
Elul reported the above information, Y aron spoke to Hobeika in English 
for about five minutes but Lieutenant Elul did not hear the conversation. 53 
According to Yaron's testimony, however, the conversation 
Lieutenant Elul relayed to him was only that "one of the Phalangists had 
asked the commander what to do with 45 people, and reply had been to 
do with them what God orders you to do" (which Yaron said he took to 
be a reference to the treatment of forty-five dead terrorists).54 Yaron 
testified that he believed Elul' s report involved the same incident he 
received in a report that evening from another source, an intelligence 
officer. 55 Shortly before 8:00p.m., an intelligence officer on the roof of 
the forward command post ordered two actions to obtain information on 
the Phalangists' activities. 56 The Report does not reveal what these actions 
had remained in the camps- because given the hostility prevailing between the various sects 
and organizations, a population without armed protection was in danger of massacre. In a 
clear jab at the United States' failure to provide protection for the civilian population, the 
Commission adds that during the evacuation negotiations, a "guarantee for the safety of the 
Muslims in West Beirut was given by the representative of the United States who conducted 
the negotiations, following assurances received from the government of Israel and from 
Lebanon." 
The author has purposefully refrained from use of the term "terrorist," because it tends to 
be an inflammatory, meaningless term, particularly in the circular context of violence and 
retaliation in the Mideast. Two examples will suffice to prove this point. Begin was the head 
of Irgun, a Jewish dissident organization, at the time of its mass murder of 250 Palestinian 
villagers in 1948 at Deir Yassin. Anwar Sadat spent thirty-one months in prison for his 
involvement in the assassination of the Egyptian Minister of Finance in 1946, for which he 
was later acquitted and released. Of course, both of these "terrorists" later received the Nobel 
Peace Prize for their efforts toward peace in the Mideast. 
49 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 12. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 12. 
56 See id. 
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were, because they are only outlined in the confidential Appendix B. 57 As 
a result of one of the actions, the intelligence officer received a report that 
the Phalangists' liaison officer overheard a radio transmission from a 
Phalangist inside the camps, which stated he was holding forty-five 
people and asked the liaison officer what to do. The Phalangist officer 
replied, "Do the will of God" or words to that effect. 58 The intelligence 
officer received this report at approximately 8:00p.m., but did not convey 
it to anyone else, including Y aron, until a briefing with Y aron that night 
at 8:40 p.m.59 The Report concludes that, although Yaron confused the 
two reports (from Elul and from the intelligence officer) in his testimony, 
they were clearly two different and separate reports of separate 
incidents. 60 The Commission had little difficulty determining that 
Lieutenant Elul had informed Y aron of the content of the conversation he 
overheard, as Elul had testified. 61 
Also at approximately 8:00 p.m., another report regarding 
Phalangists' indiscriminate killing was made in Yaron's presence. The 
Phalangists' liaison officer "G." told various people in the command post 
dining room, including Yaron and I.D.F officers, that about 300 people, 
including civilians, had been killed in the camps.62 Shortly thereafter, he 
reduced the number of casualties from 300 to 120, but no one took action 
because of either report.63 
At 8:40 p.m. in Beirut an update briefing was held in the forward 
command post for I.D.F. officers lead by Brigadier General Y aron. 64 The 
Divisional Intelligence Officer who received the earlier report regarding 
the Phalangists' liaison officer's order to "do the will of God" reported on 
the Phalangists' operations in the camps. 65 The officer's report and 
exchange with Y aron create serious implications: 
Intelligence Officer_;_ [T]hey, it turns out, are pondering what to do with the 
population they are finding inside. On the one hand, it seems, there are not 
terrorists there, in the camp. Sabra camp is empty. On the other hand, they 
have amassed women, children, and apparently also old people, with whom 
they don't exactly know what to do ... and evidently they had some sort of 
decision in principle that they would concentrate them together, and lead 
57 See id. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. at 13. 
60 See id. at 12. 
61 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 12. 
62 See id. at 13. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
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them to some place outside the camps. On the other hand, I also heard from-
(the Phalangists' liaison officer G.) ... that 'do what your heart tells you 
because everything comes from God.' 
*** 
Brigadier General Y aron: Nothing, no, no. I went to see him up top and 
they have no problems at all. 
Intelligence Officer_;_ People remaining in the field? Without their lives 
being in any danger? 
Brigadier General Y aron: It will not, will not harm them.66 
The Phalangists' actions against the civilians in the camps were not 
mentioned again. In his testimony, Y aron explained he had interrupted the 
officer because he had warned the Phalangists' officers on the roof not to 
harm civilians and had been assured they would issue such orders.67 
Between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. this same Divisional Intelligence 
Officer contacted Northern Command on his own and told the Deputy 
Intelligence Officer of the Phalangist officer's statement that 300 
terrorists and civilians had been killed and that he had subsequently 
reduced the number to 120.68 The recipients of the report at the General 
Staff Branch conveyed it by telephone to the Chef De Bureau of the 
Director of Military Intelligence at 5:30a.m. on Friday morning.69 
Y aron did not inform Major General Drori of any of the reports he 
had received about Phalangists' killing civilians, not even Friday morning 
when Drori contacted him for a report about various matters relating to 
the war.70 
During Thursday night and early Friday morning, reports of civilian 
killings began to circulate among the I.D.F. officers at the forward 
command post. When the Phalangists' liaison officer asked a Lieutenant 
Colonel Treiber for greater illumination of the camps, he refused, because 
the "Phalangists had killed 300 people."71 For some unexplained reason, 
Treiber subsequently ordered that more illumination be provided. 72 
66 See id. 
67 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 13. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. at 14-15. 
71 See id. at 15. 
72 See id. 
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The confirmation attempts continued throughout Friday morning, but 
no confirmations were successful. As a result, the report was treated as if 
unreliable and was not circulated according to standard procedure.73 
Meanwhile, I.D.F. soldiers outside the camps detected more killing 
and violent actions against refugees in the camps during those morning 
hours.74 Lieutenant Grabowsky, stationed 200 meters from the camp on 
an earth embankment, witnessed Phalangist soldiers take men, women 
and children out of the camps' area and lead them to the area near the 
stadium.75 Between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., he saw two Phalangist 
soldiers hit two young men, saw them lead the men back into the camp, 
heard a few shots and then saw the two Phalangists come out alone. 76 He 
climbed up on the embankment and saw that the Phalangist soldiers had 
killed a group of five women and children and later saw a Phalangist kill 
another civilian. 77 Other soldiers deterred him from making a report to his 
superiors. They told him that the battalion commander had already been 
informed that civilians were being killed, and he had only replied, "We 
know, its not to our liking, and don't interfere."78 
The killing continued for another twenty-three hours. Afterward, 
Y aron met with Drori but, according to Drori, said nothing to him about 
the "excesses"committed by the Phalangists.79 Yaron's version differed. 
He claimed he had telephoned Drori in the morning, because "something 
smelled fishy" to him, which led Drori to meet with him at 11:00 that 
morning. 80 The testimony regarding their discussion during that 11 :00 
meeting differs even more. Colonel Duvdevani was also present at the 
meeting. He said that he told Drori and Y aron he had a "bad feeling" 
about what was going on in the camps (based on the Phalangists' Officer 
G.'s report of approximately 300 persons dead and Israeli lack of 
knowledge about the events).81 Yaron testified that he told Drori 
everything he knew at the time. 82 The only information, which Drori 
testified he heard about the Phalangists' operations in the camps was that 
73 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 16. 
74 See id. at 17. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. What the lieutenant testified he saw from an earth embankment 200 meters from 
the camp is particularly interesting in that supposedly nothing was visible from the roof of 
the seven story command post, also 200 meters from the camp. 
78 See id. 
79 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 18. This meeting happened at an unspecified time 
following a 9:00 meeting with Phalangists. 
80 See id. at 15. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
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they were "carrying out 'an unclean mopping-up' - that is, their soldiers 
were not calling on the residents- as I.D.F. soldiers do- to come out 
before opening fire on a house which was to be 'mopped up,' but they 
were 'going into the house firing."' 83 Drori nevertheless commanded 
Y aron to, in turn, order the Phalangists to stop where they were in the 
camps and to advance no further. 84 Y aron, however, testified he had, in 
fact, suggested such an order to Drori. 85 In any event, the Report states 
that such an order was conveyed to the Phalangists' commanders.86 At 
this same meeting, Drori telephoned Chief of StaffEitan, told him that the 
Phalangists had ~erhaps "gone too far," and that he had ordered the 
operation halted. 7 
At 11:00 a.m., journalist Ze' ev Schiff met with Minister Zipori at the 
Minister's office to tell him about the report he had received of 
"slaughter" in the camps. 88 Minister Zipori in Schiff s presence, called 
Foreign Minister Shamir to discuss Schiff's report.89 Minister Zipori 
testified that he told Shamir he had received reports that the Phalangists 
"are carrying out a slaughter" and asked Shamir to check the report with 
the United States and Israeli officials with whom Shamir was to meet at 
12:30.90 
At 12:30, Minister Shamir met in his office with United States 
Ambassador Morris Draper, other United States representatives, Minister 
of Defense Sharon, the director of Military Intelligence Saguy, the head 
of General Security Services, and others not named. 91 From the Report, it 
appears that no one in the meeting made any mention of the Phalangists' 
presence or activities in the camps. The meeting ended at 3:00p.m.; the 
Foreign Minister went home and took no further action on the Report.92 
The killing continued for another seventeen hours. 
Lieutenant Grabowsky, who had witnessed the Ph alan gists' treatment 
of civilians from the earth embankment outside the camps, continued his 
own inquiry that afternoon. One of his soldiers, at his request, asked 
Phalangist soldiers in Arabic why they were killing civilians.93 He was 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
85 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 15. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. at 16. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. at 17. 
91 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 17. 
92 See id. 
93 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 17. 
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told, "the pregnant women will give birth to terrorists and children will 
grow up to be terrorists."94 Throughout the afternoon, the I.D.F. soldiers 
saw the Phalangists' treatment of men, women and children and heard 
complaints and stories of the massacre. One soldier said he heard a report 
to the battalion commander, describing the Phalangists as "running 
wild."95 Lieutenant Grabowsky left the area at 4:00p.m., and later that 
afternoon related what he had seen to his commander and other officers. 96 
They referred him to his brigade commander, to whom he reported at 8:00 
p.m., again conveying what he had seen earlier in the day.97 The battalion 
commander, in his testimony, denied receiving any report of killings or 
mistreatment of civilians other than the report that 300 were killed on 
Thursday night.98 The Report says there was no need to resolve these 
testimonial conflicts beyond the soldiers' attempts to report the acts to 
their superiors, and that these soldiers' reports did not reach Y aron or 
Drori.99 The Commission sent no 15(a) notice to the battalion 
commander, leaving any further investigation of his conduct to the 
I.D.F.100 
At 3:30 fc.m. Chief of StaffEitan met with Drori at the Khalde airport 
near Beirut. 01 They traveled from there to a meeting at Phalangist 
headquarters, joined along the way by Brigadier General Y aron. 102 Drori 
testified that he told the Chief of Staff what he knew of the Phalangists' 
actions and his reasons for halting their operation, and yet Chief of Staff 
Eitan did not see fit to ask any questions about the Phalangists' actions 
nor the order halting them. 103 At 4:00p.m. Chief of Staff Eitan, Brigadier 
General Y aron, and Major General Drori met with the Phalangist staff at 
Phalangist headquarters. 104 In this meeting, despite Drori' s earlier order 
halting the Phalangists and the report on their actions, the Chief of Staff, 
"expressed his positive impression received from the statement by the 
Phalangist forces and their behavior in the field" and concluded that they 
"continue action, mopping up the empty camps south of Fakhani until 
tomorrow [Saturday] at 5:00A.M., at which time they must stop their 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
99 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 18. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
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action due to American pressure. There is a chance that the Lebanese 
Army will enter instead of them."105 The Chief of Staff also testified that 
the Phalangists told him that "everything was alright, that the Americans 
are pressuring them to leave and they would leave by 5:00A.M .... " 106 
The Chief of Staff did not ask the Phalangists any questions or 
debrief them about activities in the camps. Eitan said he refused to permit 
them to send in more forces, but Y aron testified that there were no 
restrictions placed on the Phalangists' use of additional forces. 107 The 
killing continued beyond 5:00 a.m. the following day [Saturday], until 
8:00 a.m. An unanswered mystery raised by this portion of the Report is 
what knowledge United States officials had of the Phalangists' operations 
at this time that were bringing "American pressure" to bear on the 
Phalangists to halt their operations. 108 
During the meeting, the Phalangists requested a tractor "to demolish 
illegal structures."109 At the end of the meeting, as Brigadier General 
Y aron testified, it was "clear" that "the Phalangists could still enter the 
camps, bring in tractors and do what they wanted ...... no The one tractor 
105 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 18. This order is not the only controversial directive 
issued by Eitan. In a January 22, 1983 Philadelphia Inquirer article, it was reported that nine 
Israeli soldiers on trial for mistreating Arab detainees submitted to the court through their 
attorneys a memorandum issued by Eitan ordering harsh treatment of Palestinian 
demonstrators. AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE, THE BITTER YEAR 21 
(1983). According to the Jerusalem Post, Eitan used the military slang term "turtur'' 
(harassment or bullying) to describe treatments to be given detainees. See JERUSALEM PosT, 
Jan. 30-Feb. 5, 1983, at 4, col. 2 (intDl ed., on file with author). 
Eitan had originally stated when the massacres came to light that the Phalangists had 
entered the camps unbeknownst to the Israelis. See JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 22, 1982, at 1, 
col. 2 (on file with author). 
106 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 19. See also David K. Shipler, Killings a Shock, 
Israeli Aides Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1982, at 10. 
107 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 19. 
108 When asked for additional details of that aspect of the discussion, Major General Drori 
said he could not recall any details. See id. The New York Times reported that at 9 a.m. on 
Saturday a member of the United States embassy staff entered Shatilla, established that a 
massacre had taken place, and informed his superiors. See Thomas L. Friedman, Crisis in 
Lebanon: The Beirut Massacre, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1982, at 19. Even earlier, according to 
that same article, a group of American journalists spoke with a member of the American 
embassy staff Friday around 3:00 p.m. and mentioned the rumors they had heard that the 
Phalangists had entered Shatilla. The charge d'affaires was immediately alerted and 
contacted Amin Jemayel, who said he would check on the report. The article concludes 
"[t]his and other evidence suggests that the Phalange Party leadership, including Mr. 
Gemayel, the new President, may not have known what the militiamen were doing." See id at 
20. 
109 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 19. 
110 See id. at 18-19. 
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supplied, with its I.D.F. markings removed, was purportedly returned by 
the Phalangists shortly after they received it, since they had their own 
tractors, which they used (in large part to pile up the bodies) that night 
and the following morning. 111 The most appalling lack of concern for the 
camp-situation was the absence of questions to the Phalangists' 
commanders about the rumors and reports of murdered and mistreated 
civilians in the camps. 112 
The Phalangists did not leave the camps at 5:00 a.m., as ordered. At 
6:30 a.m., when Brigadier General Y aron learned this, he gave the 
Phalangist commander on the scene the much-needed order - that they 
must vacate the camps "without delay." 113 Between 6:30a.m. and 7:00 
a.m., a group of Phalangist soldiers entered the Gaza Hospital in Sabra 
and took a group of doctors, nurses and foreign national workers out of 
the hospital under armed guard. 114 Two doctors and a nurse who later 
testified before the Commission said they saw several cowses, groups of 
people guarded by armed soldiers, and bulldozers. 1 5 They were 
interrogated by the Phalangists and then taken to the I.D .F. forward 
command post from which they were later released.116 It was not until 
approximately 8:00a.m. that the last of the Phalangists left the camps. 117 
In all likelihood, exactly who or how many were killed in the 
massacres will never be known. The official burial of the dead was done 
by the Red Cross, which counted 328 bodies, including Palestinians, 
Lebanese, Iranians, Syrians, Pakistanis and Algerians. 118 Some survivors 
buried their less fortunate family members themselves. 119 The Phalangists 
removed truckloads of bodies. 120 Other bodies are believed to remain 
under the ruins or in mass graves the Phalangists dug. 121 The I.D.F. itself 
estimates 700 to 800 were killed. 122 Other estimates place the death toll at 
111 See Friedman, supra note 108, at 20; Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 19. 
112 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 9. 
113 See id. at 20. 
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. 
118 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 21. Palestinians were not the only victims. Of the 
estimated 328 dead, according to the Red Cross, there were 45 Lebanese, 21 Iranians, 10 
Syrians, 13 Pakistanis, and 2 Algerians in addition to Palestinians. 
119 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 21. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. 
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approximately a thousand, 123 with more than 900 people driven away in 
trucks. 124 One Israeli source suggested the total number civilians killed 
was 3,000.125 
ill. THE AFTERMATH AND ITS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
The Commission determined two levels of responsibility- direct and 
indirect. 126 According to the Commission, those directly res~onsible were 
only those who "actually perpetrated" the massacre itself. 1 7 
The Report concludes that Israel was indirectly responsible for the 
massacres: 
[T]he decision on the entry of the Phalangists into the refugee camps was 
taken without consideration of the danger- which the makers and executors 
of the decision were obligated to foresee as probable - that the Phalangists 
would commit massacres and pogroms against the inhabitants of the camps, 
and without an examination of the means for preventing this danger. 
Similarly, it is clear from the course of events that when the reports began to 
arrive about the actions of the Phalangists in the camps, no proper heed was 
taken of these reports, the correct conclusions were not drawn from them, 
and no energetic and immediate actions were taken to restrain the 
Phalangists and put a stop to their actions. This both reflects and exhausts 
Israel's indirect responsibility for what occurred in the refugee camps. 128 
For the nine individuals sent notices of harm by the Commission -
then Prime Minister Begin, Defense Minister Sharon, Foreign Minister 
Shamir, Chief of StaffEitan, Director of Military Intelligence Saguy, the 
Head of Moss ad, Major General Drori, Brigadier General Y aron, and 
Sharon's aide Dud'i- their personal liability under international law for 
the massacres would be determined, at that time, primarily by the 
Nuremberg Principles, 129 affirmed by the United Nations General 
123 See Massacre in Beirut: The Evidence from the Shameful Days, TIMES (London), Sept. 
24, 1982 at 6. 
124 For example, at 1:00 p.m. on Friday, a reporter for Danish television watched as a 
cattle truck at the southern gate of Shatilla was loaded by Christian militiamen with women 
and children from the camp. What happened to them is unknown. Individual or mass forcible 
transfers of civilians from occupied territory to any territory of any country is prohibited, 
regardless of motive under article 49(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention. See Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 
U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. 
125 See AMNON KAPELIOUK, SABRA AND SHATILLA, INQUIRY IN A MASSACRE, Ch. II (1984). 
126 See Kahan Report, supra note 2, at 23-29. 
127 See id. at 23. 
128 See id. at 29. 
129 See Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8 
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544, 3 Bevans 1238. 
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Assembly130 and acknowledged as part of customar6 international law by 
the Supreme Court of Israel in the Eichmann case. 31 The tragic irony of 
the application of the Nuremberg Principles to the Israeli officials is that 
these Principles were originally formulated to punish the atrocities of the 
Nazi regime against the Jewish people.132 
Brigadier General Y aron, according to the Report, received reports of 
the killings of women and children on Thursday evening, yet ( 1) did not 
check the report; (2) did not pass the reports on to the G.O.C. and Chief 
of Staff; and (3) did not take appropriate steps to stop the Phalangists and 
protect civilians. 133 It is inescapable, based on the Commission's 
conclusions, that at least seven of the nine individuals, including Y aron, 
should have known of the likelihood of a massacre before the 
Phalangists' entry, knew or should have known a massacre was going on 
after their entry and yet failed to take appropriate steps to protect the 
civilian population. Under the customary international law of command 
responsibility and the Nuremberg Principles, those individuals could 
therefore be responsible for war crimes. 13 
The Kahan Report, no matter how well intentioned, failed to result in 
any meaningful sanctions. Begin, Sharon, and Shamir were all criticized 
by the Commission - yet Begin stayed in office until he retired; 135 Shamir 
130 See G.A.Res. 95(a), U.N.Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1946). 
131 See Attorney General v. Eichmann, 361.L.R. 5 (Isr. D.C. (Jm.) 1961), 361.L.R. 277 
(lsr. S. Ct. 1962). See also F. BOYLE, INTENATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION AS AN 
APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1983) (Ch. IV), at 15. 
132 After World War II, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
France wrote the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which was subsequently 
applied in the trial of the German defendants at Nuremberg. It provided for individual 
criminal responsibility for crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes as 
defined in the Charter. See BOYLE, supra note 131. 
133 See id. at 19. 
134 Analysis of responsibility of the individuals for crimes against peace for the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon is beyond the scope of this article, and fully addressed in Malone, supra 
note 3. The Nuremberg Principles in Article 6(c) define crimes against humanity as 
" ... murder, extermination, ... and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population .... " Refinement of the elements of the crime by scholars and the International 
Tribunals have focused on the extent to which the crime requires that the acts have been 
committed pursuant to a state policy or systematically. The potential breadth of this issue 
alone in the context of the invasion of Lebanon is beyond the scope of this analysis, given 
the more well established grounds for liability for grave breaches in the case of Yaron's 
potential liability. 
135 In an article on Begin's resignation, political correspondent Mark Segal speculated that 
Begin's "cruelest moment" in his Lebanese adventure came "when Begin finally recognized 
the reckless and irresponsible advice he had accepted from the two generals he so admired 
and trusted -Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eitan." He goes on to remark that "Begin may today 
regret not having carried out the implied recommendation of the Kahan Report by dismissing 
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became the new Prime Minister;136 and Sharon remained in the Cabinet 
(although without his portfolio). 137 
Under the international law of command responsibility, a commander 
who knows, or should know, troops or other persons subject to his control 
are about to commit or have committed war crimes and fails to take the 
necess~ and reasonable steps to stop them is responsible for such 
crimes. 1 8 The Kahan Report concluded that Y aron should have known 
(and, in fact, he may very well have known) of the likelihood of a 
massacre and did nothing to keep the Phalangists from entering the camps 
nor did he stop the Phalangists once he received information that civilians 
were being killed. Even though the Phalangists were not under his direct 
chain of command, the Report makes it clear that Y aron, more than 
anyone else among the named Israeli individuals, exercised on-site, direct 
control of the Phalangists' entry and operations in the camps. In addition, 
his failure to intervene is complicity in genocide or conspiracy to commit 
genocide, assuming that the requisite intent for genocide is established. In 
the language of the Genocide Convention, there must be "intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, 
Sharon from his cabinet." See JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 25-0ct. 1, 1983, at 15, col. 5-6 (intDl 
ed., on file with author). 
136 See David K. Shipler, Cabinet in Israel Headed by Shamir is Voted in, 60-53, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 11, 1983, at AI and atA3 (setting forth the relatively unchanged list of Cabinet 
members, including Mordechai Zipori as Minister of Communications). 
137 Sharon has said that as long as he continues to have "some influence," he would 
continue to serve in the government. See JERUSALEM POST, July 31-Aug. 6, 1983, at 9, col. 1 
(int'l ed., on file with author). To quote Jonathan Randal, senior foreign correspondent of the 
Washington Post: 
[t]he main culprit, Ariel Sharon, neatly dodges the spirit if not the letter of the 108-page 
report enjoining him to resign. Resign he did as Defense Minister, only to stay on as 
minister without portfolio and to join two key parliamentary commissions, on defense and 
Lebanese affairs. Sharon made clear this was his, and Begin's, way of rejecting the 
commission's verdict of Israel's "indirect responsibility" for the slaughter. 
JONATHAN C. RANDAL, GOING ALL THEW AY: CHRISTIAN WARLORDS, ISRAEUADVENTURERS, 
AND THE WAR IN LEBANON, 289 (1983). See also JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 13-19, 1983, at 1, 
col. 3-5, and at 2, col. 1-5 (int'l ed., on file with author) (evaluating the friction over 
Sharon's ouster as Defense Minister). Sharon was reported to have "lashed out" at his 
colleagues in the governing Herut party for denying him a portfolio in the newly formed 
government of Yitzhak Shamir. See Sharon Asks Portfolio in Israeli Government, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 1984, at A3. As to other of the named individuals found responsible by the 
Commission, Sa guy was dismissed as Israel's chief of military intelligence and Y aron was 
stripped of his field command. See Commanders in Disgrace, TIMES (London), Mar. 2, 1983, 
at 6. Eitan retired as scheduled in April of 1983. See David K. Shipler, Israel's Military 
Chief Retires and is Replaced by his Deputy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1983, at 8. 
138 See Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); See also U.S. Dep't of Army, Field 
Manual27-10, Law of Land Warfare para. 501, at 178-79 (1956). 
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as such." 139 At the very least, Y aron acted with reckless disregard of the 
likelihood of massacres, but the mens rea element for genocide may 
necessitate a finding of purpose or knowledge for that particular liability. 
Nevertheless, Y aron' s clear responsibility for war crimes constituting 
grave breaches obligates each and every state to initiate prosecution for 
these offenses. 140 
At the time that these crimes were committed, Y aron was not entitled 
to claim immunity either under the statute of limitations or the principles 
of sovereign immunity. His ineligibility for immunity has become even 
clearer in the progressive development of international law since that 
time. Although some courts still cling to the position that sovereign 
immunity may be available as a defense to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, landmark decisions to the contrary, such as the Pinochet 
decision, the Statutes of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Treaty of 
Rome establishing the International Criminal Court, have unequivocally 
rejected immunity as a defense. International law in this area now carries 
with it the once missing element, which often called into question its 
nature as "law" - mandatory imposition of sanctions. 
When sanctions are not imposed for grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, the fault is attributable to lack of resources or political will, 
not the inadequacies of international law. In 1996, the International 
Human Rights Law Institute embarked on a project to address the 
growing problem of impunity of individuals guilty of crimes, which must 
be prosecuted under international law. 141 The project culminated in a 
document of "Guiding Principles for Combating Impunity for 
International Crimes." The Principles require criminal prosecution for 
grave breaches, torture, and genocide (among other international crimes), 
and direct all states to prosecute crimes against humanity. In addition, the 
Principles require removal of individuals responsible for international 
139 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
December 9, 1948, S. Treaty Doc. No. 81-1,78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
140 Under Article 146 of the Geneva Conventions, the state parties must enact legislation 
to provide "effective penal sanctions" for persons committing "grave breaches" as defined in 
Article 147. The parties are obligated to search for such violators and bring them to justice. 
"Grave breaches" are defined in Article 147 to include "willful killing, torture, or inhuman 
treatment ... " Under common Article 1, it is the responsibility of the states to "undertake to 
respect and to ensure respect" for the Convention in all circumstances. See Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 
U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. 
141 The proceedings of the first conference at the Holocaust Museum in Washington were 
published in 14 Nouvelles Etudes Penales. The proceedings of a succeeding international 
conference in Siracusa, Italy in September, 1997, were published in Accountability for 
International Crimes and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Vol. 59 Autumn 1996 No.4. 
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crimes from public office and the military, after according the individual 
due process in evaluating responsibility. Although never prosecuted, 
Yaron's prosecution was required by international law and is not subject 
to the defenses of sovereign immunity, statutes of limitations, or the 
defense of superior orders, a defense also precluded in the Siracusa 
Principles. Having already violated international law through its failure to 
prosecute, Israel compounded its violation in appointing Y aron to such a 
prominent and influential position. The appointment itself was prohibited 
by the Principles. The commentary to the Principles demonstrates that 
public appointment conflicts with state practice, thus violating general 
princirles of international law, even if not yet customary international 
law. 14 As negotiations for peace enter yet another fragile phase, and 
Israel demands punishment for crimes committed against Israelis, the state 
elevates to one of its most important posts, one of its most notorious 
human rights violators. The successful reconstruction of civil society 
depends upon both Palestinians and Israelis restoring public confidence in 
governmental institutions and, in this case, establishing new confidence in 
the Israeli military administration. 
142 Following his appointment, the National Lawyers Guild, the Center of Constitutional 
Rights, and Madre put out statements condemning the appointment. 
